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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





Case No. 19021 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by information with 
Distribution of a Controlled Substance for Value, Utah Code 
Ann., § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty 
of Distribution of a Controlled Substance for Value on January 
12, 1983 in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable David Sam presiding. On February 
4, 1983, appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term not 
to exceed five years and fined the sum of $500.00. Execution 
<>i the sentence was suspended and appellant placed on 
probation for a period of eighteen months. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent SCL'ks an orJ<cr of this Cuut·t aff1rm111·1 
the verdict and judc1ment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Officer Richard Mack of the Provo Police Department 
worked as an undercover officer disguised as a taxi cab driver 
in the Springville, Utah area from February through September, 
1982 (T. 15).1 Two or three weeks prior to June 10, 1982 
(T. 15), Officer Mack was contacted by Billy Roberts (T. 15). 
Roberts was unaware of Mack's true identity and had previously 
secured drugs for him in his undercover capacity (T. 15). 
Roberts told Officer Mack that "he knew where we could get 
some drugs" (T. 15) and took him to the home of appellant, 
Victor Ontiveros (T. 15). 
Although Officer Mack sought initially to purchase 
mushrooms (T. 15), appellant replied that he didn't have any 
at the time -- that he was dry (T. 17). Officer Mack asked 
when appellant would get some mushrooms or some other drugs. 
Appellant said just "later" -- that Mack would need to contact 
him at some other time because he was dry (T. 17,53). 
Appellant claimed at trial, however, that at the initial 
meeting with Mack, "I just told him that I didn't know where 
1 To avoid confusion, transcript references refer to the 
jury trial on January 12, 1903, while record references 
refer to the suppression hearing of November 22, 1982. 
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any was or I didn't know him, so I just decided I would rather 
""t talk about it" (R. 59). 
Officer Mack testified that his next meeting with 
df'l'cllant occurred on June 10 (T. 17. Appellant and his wife, 
however, both contended that Mack returned to appellant's 
residence three or four additional times before June 10 (T. 
40, 52). Appellant recalled that Mack requested marijuana at 
each of these meetings (R. 59). Appellant described his 
response as, "I didn't want to sell him any. I didn't know 
where any was. I didn't know him that good" (R. 59). At 
trial, appellant claimed that he had explained to Mack after 
each of his requests that "I didn't sell drugs. I don't do 
drugs" (T. 40). although appellant admitted to having 
previously tried marijuana perhaps three times in his entire 
life (T. 46), he still insisted that he had "been clean" since 
he was married (T. 47), or after the first six months of 
marriage (T. 47), or for a period of at least one and a half 
years before June 10, 1982 (T. 47). 
Officer Mack made two phone calls to appellant 
between their initial meeting and June 10 (T. 17). Mack 
stated that he had asked appellant "if he had got any drugs in 
yet and he [appellant] said that he was just checking to see 
if they had come in yet. . . . He said that he hadn't got it 
yet, that for some reason the dealer hadn't got to him yet 
•ir I mean his supplier" (T. 18). On the second phone call, 
a{Jpellant again replied "that they hadn't come in yet" (T. 
18). 
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When Officer Mack stopped by appellant's home on 
June 10, appellant appeared to have company, although Officer 
Mack remembered only seeing a friend of appellant's w1fp dnJ 
an additional child (T. 19-20). Appellant "iust saw me [Mark] 
at the door. He was coming back from the hallway and from the 
bedroom area and he saw me and he said, 'I guess you want some 
weed,' and I said •yes' and he said 'well come back in 
awhile.' He said, 'we are having a party here.'" (T. 20). 
When Officer Mack returned an hour later on June 10, 
appellant invited him inside, offered him a beer (T. 20), and 
made a call to a number written on a list next to the phone 
(T. 50). Appellant then turned from the phone to quote Mack a 
price of $40 per half ounce of marijuana (T. 20-21). Then, 
appellant directed Mack to drive to 1090 West 200 North in 
Provo (T. 21). Upon their arrival, Mack gave appellant $40, 
who then exited the car and entered a residence (T. 21). 
After five or ten minutes, appellant returned to the car with 
a half ounce of marijuana that he gave to Mack (T. 21, 23). 
As Mack drove appellant back to his home, appellant 
and the officer smoked a joint which had been rolled by 
appellant (T. 21, 47). Appellant then asked Officer Mack "to 
sell him enough for a joint out of the baggy. I [Mack] just 
told him 'go ahead and take a pinch,' so he took the baggy 
himself and took a little pinch" (T. 21}. Appellant also 
remembers smoking the joint and taking the pinch of marijuana 
( T. 47). 
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After dropping appellant back at his home, Officer 
was told by appellant "that he would probably get some 
""'',l1r1 11>rns in this weekend and I [officer) said 'I want some,• 
"'cl with that I left" (T. 21-22). Officer Mack did not follow 
throuyh on appellant's offer to sell mushrooms (T. 27). 
On January 12, 1983, the jury was convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of distribution of 
a controlled substance for value. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTRAPPED INTO 
DISTRIBUTING A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOR 
VALUE. 
Appellant contends as a defense to the charge of 
distribution of a controlled substance for value that he was 
entrapped as defined in Utah Code Ann., § 76-2-303 (1953), as 
amended. However, in compliance with the objective test for 
entrapment, Officer Mack's conduct did not induce appellant to 
commit such an offense by persuasion or inducement which would 
be effective to persuade an average person, other than one who 
was merely given the opportunity to commit the offense. 
Appellant made a written motion claiming entrapment 
as a defense on November 22, 1982 (T. 12), at least ten days 
before the date of trial, January 12, 1983, as required by 
Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-2-303(4) (1953), as amended. Appellant's 
m11tion to dismiss by reason of entrapment was denied on 
December l, 1982 ( T. 17). Although a jury instruction on 
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entrapment was given (#8, R. 24), appellant was nonetheless 
found guilty of distribution of a controlled substance for 
value (R. 33). 
Entrapment is recognized as a defensP in Utah Code 
Ann., § 76-2-303(1) (1953), as amended: 
It is a defense that the actor was 
entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement 
officer or a person directed by or acting 
in co-operation with the officer induces 
the commission for prosecution by methods 
creating a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct 
merely affording a person an opportunity 
to commit on offense does not constitute 
entrapment. 
Utah had traditionally adopted the subjective test of 
entrapment as exemplified in State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 
369 P. 2d 494, 496 ( 1962). The subjective test asked ( 1) 
whether there was an inducement and (2) if so, whether the 
defendant showed any predisposition to commit the offense.2 
Although Pacheco, supra was construed initially as consistent 
with the passage in 1973 of§ 76-2-303(1),3 this Court later 
recognized that the explicit wording of § 76-2-303(1) 
incorporates an objective standard of entrapment. State v. 
Taylor, Utah, 599 P.2d 496 (1979). 
2 The subjective test is adopted in Sorrells v. U.S., 287 
U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932); see generally: 
62 A.LR. 3d 110, Anno.: Modern Status of the Law Concerning 
Entrapment to Commit Narcotics Offense -- State Cases, 
§ 2(a), p. 114. 
3 State v. Curtis, Utah, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (1975). 
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The objective test focuses not on the predisposition 
ut the defendant, but "on whether the police conduct revealed 
111 the Pd rt icular case falls below standards, to which common 
l 1ngs respond, for the proper use of governmental power." 
Id. at 500. The test to determine an unlawful entrapment 
examines whether the officer "induced the defendant to commit 
such an offense by persuasion or inducement which would be 
effective to persuade an average person, other than one who 
was merely given the opportunity to commit the offenses." Id. 
at 503. Examples of prohibited police conduct are "extreme 
pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on 
sympathy, pity or close personal friendship or offers of 
inordinate sums of money." Taylor, supra, at 503; Grossman v. 
State, 457 P.2d 226-230 (Alaska 1969). 
Appellant's case law is not despositive of the facts 
of this case. Officer Mack did not initially contact 
appellant at random. Instead, appellant was introduced by 
Billy Roberts as one who could obtain drugs. This effectively 
distinguishes State v. Kourbelas, Utah, 621 P.2d 1238 (1980) 
where the undercover officer working at a marina on Lake 
Powell approached the defendant and offered to buy drugs 
without any information that the defendant had ever previously 
sold drugs. "When it is known or suspected that a person is 
engaged in criminal activities, or is desiring to do so, it is 
not entrapment to provide an opportunity for such a person to 
rctrry out his criminal intentions." State v. Curtis, Utah, 
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542 P.2d 744, 746 (1975). Roberts' introduction of appellant 
provided Officer Mack with a suspicion that appellant sold 
drugs, justifying Mack in providing appellant an opportunity 
to carry out his criminal intentions. 
Although Mack did initiate each of his four contacts 
with appellant, the officer did so based on appellant's 
representations that he would be receiving drugs. Such 
conduct is also distinguishable from that of the Kourbelas, 
supra, officer who followed the defendant back to Salt Lake 
City, initiated contact again after a two-week silence by 
defendant, and followed up five times. Officer Mack contacted 
appellant three times before the sale, once at home and twice 
with phone calls. Each of the first three encounters ended 
with appellant saying that he had not yet received the drugs, 
not that he desired to terminate his relationship with the 
officer. Officer Mack's contacts were not so frequent or high 
pressured as to induce the normal person to secure him drugs. 
State v. Taylor, Utah, 599 P.2d 496 (1979), involved 
entrapment by a police agent who was defendant's lover and who 
was suffering through heroin withdrawal. Especially given the 
defendant's former addiction, the lover's extreme emotional 
pleas were all the more manipulative. In contrast, Officer 
Mack in the instant case was merely a potential buyer in 
relation to appellant. There were no pleas of desperate 
illness, close friendship, or inordinate sums of money. On 
the contrary, appellant fixed the price of the marijuana by 
- 8 -
contacting his supplier (T. 20-21). Appellant's off-hand 
'<1>lanat ion of why he invited Mack to return on June 10 was: 
"l'hen more or less to get him out of my hair, I just called 
Lhis guy that I met" (T. 41). The officer's conduct was 
merely persistent enough to gain appellant's confidence, but 
was not a badgering or manipulation of appellant analogous to 
tile addict girlfriend's conduct in Taylor, supra. 
The subjective test applied in State v. Sorouskirn, 
Utah, 571 P.2d 1370 (1977) has been rejected. Taylor, supra, 
499. Even if the facts of Sorouskirn constituted entrapment 
on the objective standard, they are distinguishable because 
the agent in Sorouskirn had infiltrated a college dormitory, 
thrown free pot parties and brought peer pressure to bear on 
defendant. Although likely to distribute a controlled 
substance, the defendant was entrapped by such police conduct 
into distributing a controlled substance for value. The agent 
drove the defendant to the point of sale, importuned the 
defendant to purchase the marijuana from a reluctant seller, 
and importuned the defendant to return for two additional 
bags. Id. at 1371. Appellant invited Officer Mack to return 
after the party, gave directions to the supplier's residence, 
and made the purchase without further efforts by Officer Mack. 
The conduct of the undercover agent in Sorouskirn, supra, was 
of a more extensive and qualitatively different sort than the 
conduct of Officer Mack. 
The trial court had tried to find Sorouskirn guilty 
of distribution of a controlled substance for value charge. 
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In refusing to split hairs in that way, the Court held thal 
the entrapment extended to the defendant's "pinchincJ" ot the 
mariiuana baggie secured for the undercover agent. 
Sorouskirn, supra, 1371. This dicta of the Sorouskirn Court 
should not be confused with a defense of agency explicitly 
prohibited by Utah Code Ann., § 58-37-2(6), (8) (1953), as 
amended: 
(6) The word "deliver" or "delivery" 
means the actual, constructive, or 
attempted transfer of a controlled 
substance, whether or not there exists an 
agency relat1onsh1p. 
* * * 
(8) The word "distribute" means to 
deliver a controlled substance. 
[Emphasis added.] 
State v. Casias, Utah, 567 P.2d 1097 (1917)4 found the 
defendant guilty of distributing a controlled substance for 
value, § 58-37-B(l)(a)(ii), despite defendant's contention 
that he was merely an agent of the undercover agent. Id. 
1099. Neither the quoted language of Sorouskirn, supra, on 
agency, nor the facts of that case argue that appellant was 
entrapped. 
In summary, Officer Mack's conduct did not entrap 
appellant because of the following factual circumstances: 
4 Although Casias, supra, applies a subjective test of 
entrapment now discarded in Utah, the Casias ruling on 
agency in connection with the Utah Controlled Substances 
Act was not overrulled. 
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1. The initial contact was made through a friend of 
appellant who described appellant as one who 
could obtain drugs for Officer Mack; 
2. The officer initiated further contacts because 
he understood from appellant that appellant 
would be receiving drugs; and 
3. Appellant admitted to using drugs in the past; 
that he didn't make any sale on the first three 
contacts because he didn't trust the officer; 
and that by the fourth contact appellant 
instructed the agent to come back in an hour, 
which the agent did, and the sale was completed. 
The conduct of Officer Mack conforms to the 
objective test for entrapment. Four contacts over the course 
of three weeks were not such a persuasion or inducement as to 
persuade an average person, other than one who was merely 
given the opportunity to distribute a controlled substance for 
value. Any undercover effort to gain the confidence of a 
distributor would be effectively thwarted by a rule which 
found entrapment merely from multiple contacts initiated by 
the undercover officer. The nature of the contacts, their 
frequency, and the officer's rationale for pursuing contacts 
with appellant in a specific manner are all relevant to 
assessing the officer's conduct on the objective test of 
''"LL"Fwe11L. Appellant has shown no undue pressure or such 
unfair conduct by Officer Mack as to constitute entrapment. 
The officer's contacts were of such a nature as to merely 
offer appellant the opportunity to distribute a controlled 
substance for value. Therefore, appellant was not entrapped. 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TU SUPPORT A 
CONVICTION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOR VALUE. 
Appellant contends that there was insufficient 
evidence to prove that he received value from the marijuana 
distribution. Consequently, appellant claims he is guilty, if 
at all, not of distributing a controlled substance for value, 
Utah Code Ann,.§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1953), as amended, but of 
arranging the distribution of a controlled substance for 
value, Utah Code Ann.,§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (1953), as amended. 
However, appellant raises an improper defense of agency and 
clearly both distributed the marijuana and received value for 
the distribution. 
The standard for appellate review on insufficient 
evidence is stated in State v. Petree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443 
( 1983): 
We review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in 
the light most favorable to the verdict of 
the jury. we reverse a jury conviction 
for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was 
convicted. 
Id. at 444, see State v. Kereckes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 
(1980); State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980). The 
evidence presented at trial was clearly sufficient by the 
Petree, supra, standard to establish the elements of 
distributing a controlled substance for value. 
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The statutory provisions at issue under Utah Code 
Ann., § 58-37-8(a) state: 
(a) Except as authorized by this act, it 
shall be unlawful for any person 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(ii) To distribute for value or 
possess with intent to distribute for 
value a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
* * * 
(iv) To agree, consent, offer, or 
arrange to distribute or dispense a 
controlled substance for value or to 
negotiate to have a controlled 
substance distributed or dispensed 
for value and distribute, disperse, 
or negotiate the distribution or 
dispensing of any other liquid, 
substance, or material in lieu of the 
specific controlled substance so 
offered, agreed, consented, arranged, 
or negotiated. 
A defendant may be guilty of the arranging provision, § 
58-37-8(l){a){iv), without receiving value for his act of 
arranging. State v. Harrisson,5 Utah, 601 P.2d 922 (1979). 
As long as the seller receives value for the distribution, a 
defendant has arranged a distribution for value. Id. at 924. 
A defendant is guilty of distributing for value, § 
58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), if he (a) distributes, and (b) receives 
value. Appellant both distributed and received value in the 
sale of marijuana to Officer Mack. 
Appellant received $40 from Officer Mack before 
exiting the taxi and entering the supplier's residence 
S Appellant at p. 8 refers to State v. Harris with the 
correct cite for State v. Harrisson. 
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21). Officer Mack testified that given the varying prices of 
marijuana of different qualities, and the quality of the 
received marijuana, that appellant could have received a 
profit from the $40 price (T. 121). Further, Appellant not 
only shared a joint with Mack on the return trip, but was 
allowed to retain a pinch of marijuana for himself (T. 115). 
Appellant's offer to purchase the pinch (T. 42, 115) shows its 
monetary value. Thus, appellant received value from the 
distribution. 
Appellant also distributed the marijuana in 
obtaining possession from the supplier and retaining 
possession until his delivery of it to Officer Mack in the 
taxi. Under Utah Code Ann., § 58-37-2(8) (1953), as amended, 
"The word 'distribute' means to deliver a controlled 
substance." As defined in Utah Code Ann.,§ 58-37-2(6), "The 
word 'deliver' or 'delivery' means the actual, constructive, 
or attempted transfer of a controlled substance, whether or 
not there exists an agency relationship." Appellant 
transferred the marijuana from the supplier to Officer Mack. 
The dicta of State v. Sorouskirn, Utah, 571 P.2d 
1370, 1371 (1977) indicated that because the defendant was 
entrapped with regard to distribution for value that there was 
no separate offense of mere distribution of a controlled 
substance on the facts of that case. The entrapment of 
Sorouskirn, supra, does not stand for the proposition that 
defendants have available an agency defense under the Utah 
- 14 -
Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Ann.,§ 58-37-8 (1953), 
amended. See State v. Casias, Utah, 567 P.2d 1097 (agency 
n•)t determinative in finding criminal culpability under the 
Utah 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's conviction for distribution of a 
controlled substance, Utah Code Ann., s 58-37-8(a)(ii) (1953), 
as amended, should be affirmed. 
First, appellant was not entrapped by undercover 
Officer Mack. The undercover officer's conduct conforms to 
the objective test for entrapment in that it was not such 
persuasion or inducement as to persuade an average person, 
other than one who was merely given the opportunity to 
distribute a controlled substance for value. 
Second, the evidence was sufficient to support a 
conviction for distribution of a controlled substance for 
value. Appellant both distributed and received value when he 
took $40 from Officer Mack, procurred the marijuana, gave the 
marijuana to the officer and then smoked a joint with the 
officer and retained a pinch of marijuana for personal use. 
This Court should affirm the verdict and judgment of 
the trial court in appellant's trial for distribution of a 
controlled substance for value. 
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this ,-'./,/day of August, 
1983. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
( l£c . 
'.'J.L STEPHEN MIKITA 
V Assistant Attorney General 
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